Data from a series of surveys of voters in.the Midwest, conducted during the 1976 presidential election campaign, were used to explore the effects of the campaign in relation to when people decided for whom to vote. A second purpose was to consider the adequacy of the traditional dichotomous model of voters: people who make up their minds early pay close attention to the media campaign, wnile people who make up their minds late 'pay little attention to the media campaign. The resultS indicated the-,following; exposure to the campaign 'is .necessary ,for media effects; artisan precommitment is sufficient t6 prevent those effects; in -i-i e_absence of precommitment, those exposed to-the campaign will make their decisions on'the basis of its content; and in the absence of precommitmenti'those who are not exposed to the campaign will vote on the basis of prior party identification. Finally, those who decided for whom to vote during the campaign 'made up 40% of the sample. (TJ) .=, v
TIME OF DECISION AND MEDIA USE DURING THE FORD-CARTER CAMPAIGN
Fall presidential election campaigns have for three decades been thought to have little impact onthe vote, owing to a paradoxical relationship between media uae and the time at 'Which the voter makes his final decision. Since the pioneering worl-.. of Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and their, colleagues (1944; 1954) , the electorate has been pictured in terms of a dichotmous model: citizens fall into either of two pos-. Bible categories, each of which is impervious to political mass communication for a quite different reason. On the one hand there is.a large group of pre-committed voters. As Pool (1963) has described thet, these are partisans who "are inclined to read about politics or to listen to political speeches" but who "already have strong views which are not going to be changed in the eight weeks of an election campaign. '.' And then there are the rest of thes.Voters.who,make up -their Ands seemingly at the last minute. They are less opinionated. and"correlatively more persuasible than the early deciders, but they are also less interested and consequently pay little atten= tion to 'political news. They are unaffected by the media not due to resistance, but simply because of lack of exposure (Berelson and Steiner, 1964) . Buchanan (1977) summarizes prior research as demonstrating "that relatively few people changed their °Pinions during a campaign and that those who did were more likely to have been influenced by primary group pressures than by the issue appeals of the candidates; . . and that 'independent' or shifting voters were not issue -oriented in their outlook."' ' Katz (1973) those who shift from one part:w. to another during the campaign --have been found to be relatively uninterested in the election and its outcome . . . [and] are\not much exposed to mass communications about politics" (emphasis his). This dichotam us comparison is clearly central to the ubiquitous generalization that political mass ommunica:
tion can be expected to have only "limited effects:" And while the Limited Effects model has come in for considerable skepticism and general criticism in recent -years (e.g. Chaffee,.1975; Kraus and Davis, 1976) , the,Early-Late Deciders contrast has without serious challenge since the first voting studies of the 1940s.
A'dchotomous model does not exhaust the logical possibilities in this analysis, however, unle'ss.one'assumes a very strong correlation between interest in an election and partisan pre-commitment. While this might have been the case at the time the first major syntheses of research on political communication were written, there is good reason to suspect that, it is less so today. For several decades, voter identification with political parties has been decreasing, as has the power of researchers to predict voting patterns from party affiliation (Nie, Verba and Petrocik, 1976) .
But there is little evidence that interest in politics, or attentionto political mass communication, has been decreasing in this same period. 1 As Katz (1973) comments, "The combination of the, low degree of [party] loyalty and yet some ekposure to election communication has become a more probable combination inAthe era of television than ever before." It is possible that .a third group of some size has evolved, one that consists of highly attentive but not highly partisan or pre-committed voters. Such an emergence would not simply complicate the accepted view by expanding a dichotomous model into a trichotomous one. It would call into serious question the "limited effects" concept, that gr.rws out of the dichotomized.image of the electorate. The dominant theoretical scheme from prior literature can be broken dOwn into the causal propositions:
1. Partisan pre-commitment is sufficient to prevent effects.
2. Partisan pre-commitment is necessary to produce interest in the election..
3.
IntereSt in the election is necessary to stimulate exposure tathe.camnaign, .f4..Exposure to the campaign-isllecessary for media effects.
The first of these statements is adequate to predict limited (at most) effects for those who identify st ongly with a party and who corpequently decide how they will vote be- voting, which has been manifested empirically by the increased ability of researchers to predict the vote on the basis of the positions of candidates and voters on current policy issues (Nie et al., 1976) .
Time of final decision is a _useful _.indicator to employ in the_search for_voters _ who do not fit into either traditional category. Decision time has a long-standing , position in the research literature on communication and voting, and it is a concrete behavior that can be tracked throughout the duration of a campaign. If voters are interviewed with sufficient frequency, a number of groups can be identified in terms of the-point at which they shift from "undecided" or "leaning" to the "definitely decided" category. In this-parier attempt to identify three such groups: (a) those who are precommitted; as evidencedloy their having a, firm voting intention at the beginning of'the campaign, and never wavering from it in subsequent interviews;
(b) those who decide during the campaign period; and (c) those. Who decide at the very end of the campaign, as indicated by their lack of a definite voting intention when interviewed just prior to Election Day--but who.do vote. and attention to the campaign via the news media. All three surveys were coLducted during the 1976 presidential election campaign, and were originally designed as studies of the Ford -Carter debates of that fall. None of the samples is large, and so statistidal significance will be lacking in some comparisons. Confidence in our findings must be based more upon replication from one data set to another. In any event, this paper'is intended as an exploratory investigation of an important research -possibility thathas been ignored for some three decades, not as an attempt to arrive at definitive conclusions. To the extent that our results are promising, we expect this to be the first examination of the issues we are raising, scarcely the final word.
The most representative data set comes from a-four-wave statewide panel of
Wisconsin residents (T=164).2 They were interviewed before the first debate (Ti) and after it (T2), then' again after all the debates (T3) and finally after the election (T)1). The supplementary data sets are three-wave panels from two midwestern cities.
Onewas sampled from registered voter lists in Madison, Wisconsin.(N=95), and was weighted deliberately by the original investigators (McLeod et al., 1977) to over- data set was provided by investigators at the Uriversity of Iowa; it is a stratified random sample of Potential voters aged 18 and older in CedaZRapids, Iowa (N=149).4
Like Madison its state's second-largest city, Cedar Rapids is slightly more likely tO vote Democratic than isjowa as a whole but it'is not particularly noted as a center of political activity. The Wisconsin statewide design has a T2 wave ande,also a post-debates,
The Madison 'study has one intervening wave, which expre-election tends across the period of the final Ford-Carter debate; for approximate comparability with the other studies, we have labeled this T3 also.
Due both to differences in the timing of.interviews and to differences in the Those who were certain of their intentions at T Early DeciderS While neither method is error-free, the measures we are using were taken-much'closer in time to the events that are of central interest in this paper.°O ther research has shown that retrospectiVe questions are much more likely to introduce 
Note. The composite classification represents respondents pooled from the three samples, and classified as Early, Campaign Or Late Deciders according to their own, retrospective reports and using the same time-cuts as, were used to divide the sample into the three time-of-decision groups, represented in the columns of this gories were used to classify responses to these retrospective questions, and the time of measurement-differs '(see so it would be difficult to compare data from oile study to another.
The measures we are using are admittedly not optimal for our purposes. As in o any secondary analysis of data collected with other research questions in mind, we must work with the best evidence we can find, on the assumption that encouraging results will lead eventually to research designed more specifically to explore the implications of this study.
ReSults! Difference,.. Among Groups For the most part, the data on partisanship, ideology, and current campaign activii would lead a devotee of the dichotomous time-of-decision model to treat the Campaign -Deciders as substantialy like the traditional Late7Deciders. When we look in Table   2 at our many indicators of attention to the campaign, however, a radically different conclusion is suggested.
Viewing of the Ford-Carter debates, and exposuretocampaign-or public affairs news via television and print sources, tend to be consistently high among-the Campaign Deciders. Only for print media are the. Early Deciders also high. There are some remarkable similarities in the standard scores from one sample to another, considera. a.
ing that there'were many differences'in the wording and coding of the questions 'asked.
The Campaign Deciders are considerably'higher than the other two groups on three of four indicators of debate viewing, and on all three estimates of television Campaign/ news exposure. The. Late Deciders are aiMost always below the mean on the various mass Communication measures,sbeing the lowest of the three gro-apsin 9 of the il.comparisons in Table. 2. The main point is clear: the Campaign Deciders constitute a dis-.
tinctive group that is"heavily exposed to the campaign but is not insulated from media -influence by strong partisan pre -commitments.
Another portion of the traditional view is controverted by,the data.in Table 2 regarding interpersonal discussion ofthe election. The Late Decidere, Who'as we i;
noted earlier have been assumed to be subject to interpersonal influence, are con-°s is associated with media use rather than being a functional alternative to it. a A-striking example of replication of findings between samples is shown in Table 2 , the Campaign Deciders stand out as the most issue-oriented group.
They are more likely to say issues were important to them, and that the debates were helpful in learning about issues or to get an idea of what the candidates would do if elected. It is clear from a variety of evidence in other studies that the Ford-Caxter debates were heavily issue -oriented media events, and that those who watched them did so largely to learn where the candidates stood on policy questions (hears and Chaffee, in press). It is noteworthy that the Campaign Deciders were alSo much more likely than other voters to say that these debates helped them decide which way to vote.
Finally, lest we overdraw the image of an exceedingly "rational" voter, Table 2 shows that the Campaign Deciders were also the ones most likely to watch the debates in a search for the strong points of the candidate they already preferred, i.e. for reinforcement of Shaky vote intentions. The Campaign Deciders did trot go into the campaign with no idea who they would vote for; in most cases they were leaning toward a candidate already at Tl. What they did do was to withhold theirfinal commitments 'until they had a chance to compare"Ford and-Carter in direct confrontations and to listen to what'each had to say. From the perspective of the question of potential' media influence, the Campaign Deciders do fit rather well the conditions that would.
be necessary for a fall campaign to have an impacts weak partisan pre-commitments, high attention to campaign information,. and an openness to comparative information . 12 about the candidates and their issue positions. The most common result-was that tentative voting plans became crystallized into firm decisions (see also Sears and Chaffee, in press We found in Table 2 overall greater attention to mass media reports concerning the election campaign.
They were also more attentive to the televised debates. Figures 2 3.and 4 trace these group differences across time in the pre-election waves of the Wisconsin survey. Figure 2 shows little difference among the three groups at T1, but the,Campaign Deciders display a notable jump thereafter, so-that the groups differ signifiCantly at T2 and at T3. A similar set of trends.is found in Figure 3 for campaign news reading, although the Early and Campaign Deciders are never far apart. Figure 4 shows that across the series of four debates the Campaign Deciders were consistently high, although they like the other groups were inclined to skip the vice-presidential debate between Mondale and Dole:
To test the significance of the patterns shown in Figures 2-4 This Tl index was of course astrong predictor of the analogous T2+T3 index, accounting for more than 41% of the variance. In the remaining blocks, dummy variables representing the time-of-decision grotps, and the interaction of time-of-decision 'with T1 campaign .media attention, were entered. In each case; only the independent variable representing the Campaign De.ders differed significantly from the others (p<.01 for the main effect of Campaign Deciders, and p<.05 for the interaction between Campaign Deciders and Tl campaign attention). Because of the significant interaction, we derived three separate regression equations from the overall analysis:
Early Deciders: T2+T3 Attention = 13.6 + (2.5 x T1 Attention)
Campaign Deciders: T2+T3 Attention = 21.2 +(1.5 x T1 Attention)
Late DeCiders: T2+T3 Attention = 10.3 + (2.9 x T1 Attention)
ThiS set of equations illustrates that the.significant.differentiation of the Campaign ---:;--Deciders from the other two groups consisted of (I) a higher level of attention to the media a-during the_later phase of the campaign, and (2) a_lower_degree of predic-, tability of that attentionindex from prior levels of attention.
o A similar analysis of. the antecedents ofanindex of campaign diScussion`was also performed. We combined, and weighted equally,,measures of,diS-cussion-of the campaign, including the debates; the Early'Deciders were somewhat higher on the first measure and the Campaign Deciders higher on the second. But in the hierarchical re-,.
gression analysis there was no significant main" effect due to the time-of-decision dummy variables, and no significant interaction between.the_groups and the T 1 level ,of 'discussion.. While null findings are not normally of much,momentlin this case lie should note again the stress laid in prior literature on the presuined importance_ of interpersonal discussion among the Late Deciders).-The basis on which that group makes its voting decisions remains something of a mystery, except to say that they appear to have relatively little to go on beyond their rather weak party identifications (see Table 2 ).
We also used orthogonal polynomial multiple regression analyses to test the cur-, vilinear relationships between time of decision and two dependent variables: media atte4ton and,interpersonal discussion. 9 For this pUrpose, the Campaign Deciders were divided into two subgroups, those who had reached'definite decisions by T2 and 14 those Who did not decide until T3, thus making the time of decision variable into a four-point scale. For each of the two dependent variables, the linear function was non-significant. For media attention, the quadratic function, which roughly represents a curve that is low for T1 and T4 deciders and high for T2 and T3 deciders, was significant at the .05 level (F=5.58). This is in accord with our hypotheses. For campaign discussion, the quadratic function was non-significant;t here was, however,a near significant cubic function (F=3.35) for campaign discussion.
If replicated this finding would mean that those who decided by Ti And also those who did not decide until T 3 ("Later Campaign Deciders") were higher than the other two 1 groups in interpersonal discussion. This finding regarding the latter group is especially.intriguing; it suggests that theremay:be a subset of voters who pay close' attention to the entire campaign, and discuss it rather extensively,before deciding which way tovote. Unfortunately the small sample Size in this case pre-/ dudes our investigating this lead further here.' 0.
To. this point 'the reader may find it odd that in" an analysis of a major election campaign we have not dealt with themost central questions raised by elections: Who won, and why? As might be expected from earlier literature, the Republican vote was determined earlier: Ford won 59% of the Eax:ly Deciders and Carter 62% of the Late Deciderg; among the Campaign Deciders, Ford had a slight 52-48 edge. More important to us here'is the basis for these votes. Our earlier discussion focused on partyidentification as a long-standing predictor that appears to be on the wane, and policy ssues and possibly candidate images as factors that might be replacing partisanship.
Dra again on the Wisconsin statewide data set, we used three policy issue mea-.
sures tha were associated with the vote: government efforts to alleviate uneimployment .reform o the tax system, and defense expenditures. We alSo. created an index from five "image" "t ibutes: honesty and integrity, strength and decisiveness, capacity for effective 1 ership of the government, making clear his position on the issues, and ability to in re confidencaby the..way he speaks. The T3 perceptions of Carter and Ford on each of these items, plus the respondent's own preferredposition on the three issues, were measured n 5-point scales. Ford-Carter image differences were scored and summed across items; for the-issues, Ford-self and Carter-self differences were calculated and the net absolute differences summed.
Because of high multi -collinearity between the issue and image indices (r=.61)
we ran separate regression analyses in Which each was entered as a second independent variable after party identification. The results are shown in Table. 3, in terms of the additional amotnts of variance explained (R2).
While most of the entries in Table. 3 are significant, we should focus our attention mainly on the differences between 1,re-campaign party-identification and in-campaign perceptions of the candidates as predictors, and the differences among the three time-of-decision groups. Because we have used hierarchical regression, it appears in Table 3 that Tarty identification-explains a: greater amount of variance than do either issues or images; this is not necessarily the case. Table 3 is not intended as a test of the predictive powers of these different variables, but as a means of comparing their relative importance for the three time-of-decision grotps.
There is in Table 3 a clear contrast between Campaign Deciders and the other.
. two groups, in that party' identification is a much more important predictor of the vote for the Late and Early Deciders than it is for the Campaign Deciders. The Early Deciderd also display a Significant tendency to yote in conformance'with perceived candidate attributes, when party identification is controlled (Am.58). Among the Campaign Deciders,-isgues are more important than in the other .groups and, the personal "image" qualities attributed to the candidates appear to make a particularly important contribution to the vote debision. ,_The isuue-image distinction seems to be more a researcher's convention than a critical theoretical difference; the two indices are highly intercorrelated. The persOnaIities of the candidates are probably perceived and processed by most voters much like other "i;sue" discriminations.
Possibly the most illuminating finding in Table 3 is that the votes of the Late Decides (who are not particularly partisan) are predicted exclusively by party identification in this analysis. -Apparently.their lack of,attention to the campaign via , Returning to our breakdown of the previously accepted theoretical scheme, it appears that some serious revisions are in order. Notably, the correlation between partisan pre-commitment and campaign media exposure, on which the limited-effects model is based does not exist in the Campaign Deciders. The following statements would be a better s .
of the evidence we have reviewed in this paper:
1. Exposure to the campaign is necessary for media effects., Partisan,pre-commit' nt is sufficient to prevent,effects.
3. In the absence of p e-commitMentl.those ekposed'will make their de- to the Early Deciders; 'they are both,pre-consnitted and highly partisan, and they do not show strong evidence of campaign impact'even though they are eXiioied to itto' . , .
,some. extent.
Statemen4; #3 is generally characteristic of the 'Campaign Deciders, who are at most tentativel4 pre-committed and not especially partisan, and who are ex-.
posed most heavily to the campaign and vote on the basis-ofissue and image perceptions that are specific to it. Statement #4 describes the Late Deciders to the extent that we have been able to account for their behavior.' Although these voters lack a strong party identification in the absence o exp ure to the campaign they end up voting.
I a in ,the,direction of their latent pattisan leaningSanywayl they give no evidence of candidate -.or issue-speciffc vote decisions. Were unsure of their Choices and a-considerable amount of information was provided via the'campaign and the debates. In 1960 those conditions also held; Pool (1963) 'concluded that the debates were "the decisive event of the 1960 campaign," but treated this instance as if it were an exception to the general rule of limited effects.
-it now appears that when the same conditions recur in the future, we should again expect-important media impact on voting.
For expository purposes, we have treated the governing conditions as simply present or absent.-But in theory they. are variables. 
